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Pottow:

THE RISE IN ELDER BANKRUPTCY
FILINGS AND THE FAILURE OF U.S.
BANKRUPTCY LAW
John A. E. Pottow
Recent empirical legal scholarship on the consumer bankruptcy system has uncovered
a marked rise in the proportion of elder Americans filing for relief under the
Bankruptcy Code. But these studies have not probed the reasons behind that rise, an
omission this Article seeks to address. Professor John Pottow and colleagues recently
assembled the new dataset of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP), the largest
national sample of consumer debtors in this country, which he uses to explore the
sources of elder bankruptcy. The findings are both striking and ominous. While
multiple factors, such as health problems and medical debts, contribute to elders’
financial distress, the dominant force appears to be overwhelming burdens related to
credit cards. Elder debtors carry fifty percent more credit card debt than younger
debtors, and they cite credit card interest and fees as a reason for their bankruptcy
filings fifty percent more frequently, results that are highly statistically significant.
Professor Pottow uses further survey and court record data from the CBP to explore
why elders rely upon credit cards more than their younger counterparts. Finally,
Professor Pottow addresses the current Bankruptcy Code, noting that it is both a
theoretical and doctrinal mismatch for elder debtors, and proposes possible reforms.

John A. E. Pottow is Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. Professor Pottow received his A.B. in psychology, summa cum laude, from Harvard College and his J.D., magna cum laude, from Harvard Law School.
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Recent empirical scholarship on the consumer
bankruptcy system has documented a marked rise in the proportion
1
of elder Americans filing for relief under the Bankruptcy Code.
2
Although somewhat modest in absolute percentages (7.0%) and still
3
beneath their proportionate level of the general population (12.4%),
the rate of increase of this demographic within the ranks of the
bankrupt has been striking. This Article uses the dataset of the
Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP), assembled in 2007, to explore
4
the conditions of these elder filers. Although teasing causation out of
5
cross-sectional data is a perilous task, the hope is that analysis of
some of the unique characteristics of these elder debtors will shed
light on the underlying puzzle: why are elder Americans filing for
bankruptcy at such an alarmingly increasing rate? The data suggest a
phenomenon driven largely, although not exclusively, by credit cards.
For example, credit card interest and fees are the most cited reason for
filing bankruptcy by elders, with two-thirds of elder debtors
specifically invoking this reason, substantially more than the half of
younger debtors who do so. Findings also reveal that the median
elder debtor in bankruptcy carries fifty percent more credit card debt
than the median younger filer. After presenting these data, this
1. See, e.g., Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & Teresa A. Sullivan, The Increasing Vulnerability of Older Americans: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Court, 3
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 87 (2009).
2. See id. at 97.
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION BY
SELECTED AGE GROUPS AND SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1,
2006 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST
2006-sa.html.
4. The Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP) is a multi-institutional consortium of which I am a co-principal investigator. Funding for the CBP was provided
in part by grants from the American Association of Retired Persons, the Harvard
Law School, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the University of Michigan
Office of Vice President for Research, and the University of Michigan Law School.
The co-principle investigators of the CBP are: David U. Himmelstein, Professor of
Public Health, City University of New York; Melissa B. Jacoby, George R. Ward
Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law; Robert M. Lawless,
Professor of Law and Galowich-Huizenga Faculty Scholar, University of Illinois
College of Law; Angela K. Littwin, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas
School of Law; Katherine M. Porter, Professor of Law, University of Iowa College
of Law; Teresa A. Sullivan, President, University of Virginia; Deborah K. Thorne,
Associate Professor, Ohio University; Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of
Law, Harvard Law School; and Steffie Woolhandler, Professor of Public Health,
City University of New York.
5. See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein, Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren &
Steffie Woolhandler, Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 745 (2009).
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Article briefly considers current bankruptcy law and policy, noting
how poorly suited the Bankruptcy Code is to assist those elder
Americans whose financial distress has brought them to seek relief in
the courts.

I.

The Swelling Ranks of Elder Bankruptcy Filers

Bankruptcy filers are getting older. The median age of a filer
was 36.5 in 1991, which increased to 40.6 in 2001, and increased again
6
to 43.0 by 2007. Moreover, the number of elder filers has risen quickly. As first reported in our findings published in 2008, CBP data show
the number of bankruptcy filers age sixty-five and over doubled from
7
2.1% in 1991 to 4.5% in 2001. This trend persisted in 2007 as the proportion of filers in this age group rose further to 7.0%. (See Table 1.)
Indeed, the age sixty-five-and-over cohort is the fastest growing age
demographic within the CBP sample.

6. See Thorne et al., supra note 1, at 93 fig.1. The median age of the general
population was 36.1 for 2007, an imperfectly comparable number given that children traditionally do not file bankruptcy but are included in the general population
count. Id.
7. “Filers” comprise the co-petitioning spouse in a joint petitioner bankruptcy. (Married couples may, but need not, file joint petitions.) Thus, in reporting
our age findings, we count a bankruptcy filing as “elder” if either the primary or
co-petitioning debtor is age sixty-five or over in the case of joint petitions. (We obviously also count all single petitions where the petitioner is age sixty-five or over.)
Note that this will actually undercount the number of elder Americans affected by
bankruptcy filings, because we miss the cases in our count where there is a married petitioner under age sixty-five who files a single petition but is married to a
spouse who is age sixty-five or over.
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TABLE 1

Source: Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren, and Teresa A. Sullivan, The Increasing Vulnerability of Older Americans: Evidence From the Bankruptcy Court, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
87, 93, tbl 1 (2009) (reporting CBP data).

These findings on the greying of the bankruptcy population are consistent with other studies. For example, in a study of 24,038 applicants
for credit counseling (a necessary prerequisite to filing bankruptcy),
the Institute for Financial Literacy reported that 7.8% of applicants
8
were age sixty-five or over. Similarly, an Administrative Office of the
United States Court (AO) statistician and analyst reported that the
median age of a bankruptcy filer had risen from 37.7 in 1994 to 41.4 by
9
2002. Another recently released AO paper found the number of peti-

8. LESLIE E. LINFIELD, INST. FOR FIN. LITERACY, AGING AND BANKRUPTCY:
ARE OLDER AMERICANS TRULY AFFORDED AN ECONOMIC FRESH START? 7–8 (2007);
accord Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Filers Most Likely in
25–44 Age Range, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2001/Jan. 2002, at 28, 29 (finding that of
1931 no-asset Chapter 7 cases that were closed in 2000, 6.5% of the debtors were
age sixty and over).
9. John Golmant & Tom Ulrich, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Aging and Bankruptcy—The Baby Boomers Meet Up at the Bankruptcy Court, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May
2007, at 26, 27. The authors report their age cut-off at fifty-five, and so while one
cannot compare CBP data directly, they do seem consistent. Id.

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art17

4

Pottow:

223
tioners age sixty-five and over to be 7.4%. Smaller scale bankruptcy
11
studies have reached similar results. According to general population research, the growing elder financial distress does not seem con12
fined to bankruptcy. Indeed, this greying phenomenon also seems
13
to have hit other countries. The run-up in elder bankruptcy filings,
thus, may well be part of a broader social trend. All that is known for
certain at this point is that the trend of rising elder bankruptcies is
pronounced and persistent. The challenge for scholars is to try to understand why it is so.
10

II. Scrutinizing Elder Debtors: The Consumer
Bankruptcy Project
The initial data in the previous section reporting the age of bankruptcy filers were gathered from the CBP, a multi-institutional consortium of scholars from various disciplines, including law, medicine,
14
and sociology.
Methodological summaries of the CBP’s research
protocols have been published in varying degrees of detail elsewhere,
15
so only the briefest of summaries follows. The CBP is the first national sampling of consumer bankruptcy filers after the Bankruptcy

10. See John Golmant & James A. Woods, Aging and Bankruptcy Revisited, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2010, at 34, 74.
11. See, e.g., Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: A Closer
Look at Elderly Chapter 7 Debtors, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2002, at 22, 22 (estimating 4.4% of no–asset, non-business Chapter 7 cases closed from 1998–2000 were
filed by petitioners age seventy or older).
12. HANA HOLLEY, RETIREMENT PLANNING SURVEY AMONG U.S. ADULTS AGE
40 AND OLDER 20–21 (2006), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/
ret_planning.pdf (reporting thirty percent of surveyed retirees viewed their debt
levels as a “problem”).
13. See Janis Sarra, Growing Old Gracefully, An Empirical Investigation into Elderly Bankrupt Canadians, in ANN. REV. OF INSOLVENCY LAW 2006, at 783, 784 (Janis
Sarra ed., 2007) (reporting more than a doubling of Canadians over age fifty-five
filing for bankruptcy within a decade).
14. I am one of the ten current co-principal investigators of the Consumer
Bankruptcy Project. For helpful links on CBP research, visit Harvard’s cognate
Bankruptcy Data Project at http://bdp.law.harvard.edu/fellows.cfm. (last visited
Apr. 19, 2011).
15. See Robert Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Fail?, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349,
387–98 (2008) (offering comprehensive methodological summary). An analysis of
methodological issues specific to analyzing data from the elder subpopulation is
available in Deborah Thorne, The (Interconnected) Reasons that Elder Americans File
Consumer Bankruptcy, 22 J. AGING & SOC. POL’Y 188, 190 (2010).
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Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).
Our core dataset constitutes approximately 2500 questionnaires returned from filers in all U.S. judicial districts from a period in early
2007. Extensive coding of the bankruptcy court filings of questionnaire respondents was also added to this dataset. Finally, a subset of
1000 of the respondents completed in-depth telephone interviews
with trained researchers. Thousands of pieces of data were collected
on over a thousand bankruptcy filers, including through telephone
interviews. By examining these court records and surveys, the CBP
dataset allows rich insights into the many Americans facing financial
17
distress who find need to seek relief in the bankruptcy courts.
Because our previous research already indicated a notable rise in
elder Americans filing for relief, we augmented our CBP core sampling of randomly selected debtors with a deliberate oversample of
debtors age sixty-five and older. Again, detailed elaboration of the
process we used to find the ages of these filers is available else18
where. To summarize, through a process of age estimation (age is
not listed on the court records), the CBP was able to target an additional 192 bankruptcy filers throughout the surveyed districts where
the primary or secondary petitioner was age sixty-five or over. Combined with the core sample, this yielded a dataset of hundreds of elder
19
bankruptcy filers (one of the largest such sets to date).
The richness of the CBP dataset allows us to study with greater
nuance why elder Americans might be filing for bankruptcy at such
an increasing rate. Most previous studies rely upon the court records
alone, which allows only limited insight beyond the identity of credi20
tors and amount owed.
For example, one such earlier study sug16

16. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005); see also Lawless et al., supra note 15, at 354 (discussing CBP).
17. As discussed in a previous publication of some of these data, we have no
intrinsic reason to believe BAPCPA had any age-specific effects; as such, we would
not predict the rise in elder filers to be a consequence of anything in the 2005
amendments. See Thorne et al., supra note 1, at 91.
18. See Thorne, supra note 15, at 204 n.3.
19. Compare, for example, Flynn & Bermant, supra note 11, at 22, who examined only thirty-nine elder debtors.
20. For example, the Golmant and Ulrich study, Golmant & Ulrich, supra
note 9, while methodologically rigorous, relies upon court record data alone. Such
studies are important but contribute to our understanding of the circumstances of
elder bankruptcy filers differently. The same limitation applies to the Flynn and
Bermant studies. Flynn & Bermant, supra note 8; Flynn & Bermant, supra note 11;
Flynn & Bermant, infra note 21.
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gests credit card debt plays a large role in elder filings but is left to
concede with frustration, “Unfortunately, the bankruptcy petitions
[on their own] do not reveal much about how this debt was incurred.
We have no information regarding how the credit cards were used—
21
e.g., for medical debt, living expenses, luxury items, gambling, etc.”
The CBP’s dataset builds upon these prior court record efforts by supplementing publicly available data with rich details from selfreporting. This allows examination of these issues in greater depth,
the results of which are reported in this Article.

III. Credit Cards Causing Elder Filings
A.

Self-Report Metric from Questionnaire

The simplest way to discover why people file for bankruptcy is
22
to ask them. The CBP questionnaire has just such a question, providing a non-exclusive choice of answers from which respondents can
23
pick. The non-exclusive choice format means debtors can pick more
than one reason. In reporting the data below, I include any respondent who cites the “credit card” reason, whether it was the exclusive
explanation for the filing or whether it was one of several others, such
24
as a medical reason. Here is where one finds the first and most important datapoint: the elder filers most frequently selected credit
cards—more specifically, the fees and interest rates on their credit
cards—in explaining why they went bankrupt. Of the elder debtors,

21. Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Credit Card Debt
in Chapter 7 Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 20, 20.
22. It is also a highly reliable way. See generally David U. Himmelstein, Elizabeth Warren, Deborah Thorne & Steffie Woolhandler, MarketWatch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2, 2005, http://content.
healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/02/02/hlthaff.w5.63.full.pdf+html.
23. One choice from the menu of non-exclusive reasons was “Interest and fees
on credit cards were overwhelming.”
24. This methodological decision reflects a preference at the margin for clarity
over nuance. For example, as a more nuanced test, I could have cross-referenced
the open-ended narrative question that respondents were invited to complete to
expand on their bankruptcy filing experience to assess whether, for example, credit cards were the “driving purpose” of the filing, but I preferred the bright-line
clarity of the cruder approach. I also considered including only respondents who
cited credit card reasons alone when responding to the reason-for-filing question; I
rejected that approach based on the considerable number of respondents who
cited more than one reason from this non-exclusive list. Ultimately, I am interested in how many people feel credit cards played at least “a part”—indeed, a part
significant enough for them to self-report in reflecting on causal forces—in their
collapse into bankruptcy.
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66.6% reported credit cards as a reason for filing. Not only was this
the most frequently cited reason (followed by “medical reasons”), but
elder debtors chose “credit cards” as an explanatory reason more frequently than younger debtors to a statistically significant degree.
(Only 53.3% of younger debtors cited credit card reasons, p < 0.01.)
(See Figure 1.) Thus, two-thirds of elder Americans who filed for
25
bankruptcy ascribed credit cards as a reason for their downfall. This
26
finding accords with the implication of earlier U.S. studies and stu27
dies from other countries.
(“Implication” is used because most of
these studies were unable to report the debtors’ self-ascribed reasons
for filing.)

25. Although not similarly worded, and although drawn from a different
population (credit counseling applicants), the data from the Institute for Financial
Literacy are somewhat similar. “Overextended on credit” was cited by 62.8% of
applicants (more than any other reason given) as a cause of financial distress.
LINFIELD, supra note 8, at 13. Similarly, a study of Canadian debtors over age fiftyfive found “overextension of credit” as the most frequently listed primary cause of
bankruptcy and that that reason increases in likelihood as a function of the debtor’s age. See Sarra, supra note 13, at 801–02.
26. These numbers continue the rising trend of elder credit card debt. For example, in the 2002 Flynn and Bermant study (based on no-asset, non-business
Chapter 7 filings from 1998–2000), the authors estimate $24,360 in median bank
credit card debt for age-reporting filers age seventy or over (vs. $10,587 median
credit card debt for younger filers) plus an additional $2233 in median store credit
card debt (vs. $1035 median store credit card debt for younger filers). See Flynn &
Bermant, supra note 11, at 22, 49 tbl.2. Similarly, a related study published in 2004
(based on data from no-asset, non-business Chapter 7 filings from 2000 to 2002)
estimates that “average” credit card debt for age-reporting filers age sixty-five or
over was $27,787—the highest of any other age demographic—although the measurements used are not directly comparable. See Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21, at
74 tbl.4. A third study from 2003 (based on no-asset, non-business Chapter 7 filings from 2000) estimates $35,917 in mean credit card debt for age-reporting filers
age sixty or more. See Flynn & Bermant, supra note 8, at 4.
27. See Sarra, supra note 13, at 798–99 (finding that while overall debt decreases as a function of age of Canadian debtors over age fifty-five, credit card debt by
contrast increases).
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FIGURE 1
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Source: Author's calculation of 2007 CBP data.

B.

(p<0.01)

Credit Card Trends from Court Records

In addition to measuring the effect of credit card debt through
self-ascription as reported above, the CBP also coded court records for
incidence of credit card debt, in part to share methodology with prior
studies. Even though it was used as a method in prior studies, coding
court records proved difficult given the ambiguities in creditor identification. Recognizing these ambiguities, the CBP employed two concentric definitions of credit card debt, loosely corresponding to “definitely” credit card debt and “probably” credit card debt, based on the
28
identity of the scheduled creditor.
Both definitions showed stark
28. A debt was considered “definitely” credit card debt if the listing on Schedule F of the bankruptcy petition contained the words “credit card,” “card,” “revolving credit,” “charge account,” or closely similar terms. Also, any listing that
contained brand name words for a credit card such as “Visa,” “Mastercard,” or
“Discover” was counted as definitely credit card debt. Debts were considered
“probably” credit card debt if the listing on Schedule F contained the name of one
of the top ten credit card issuers at the end of 2006 (Bank of America, JP Morgan
Chase, Citigroup, American Express, Capital One, Morgan Stanley (Discover),
HSBC Holdings, Washington Mutual, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bancorp), even if the listing did not contain words like “credit card” or a brand name like “Visa.” Debts
were also considered probably credit card debt if they used the terms “line of credit,” “revolving loan,” or “personal loan” in the Schedule F description.
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differences by age. For debtors who held at least some credit card
debt, younger filers had a median of $13,615 in definite credit card
debt and $15,499 in combined definite and probable credit card debt,
contrasted with elder debtors, who had a median of $22,562 in definite
and $27,213 in combined definite and probable credit card debt, high29
ly significant differences under either metric (p < 0.001 for each).
(See Figure 2.) The court record data are thus consistent with the
questionnaire results showing credit cards as the engine for elder fil30
ings. Indeed, not only do elder bankruptcy filers have more credit
card debt than younger filers, they carry substantially higher balances
than their non-bankrupt age group cohorts in the general popula31
tion. In sum, elder debtors are not just growing in number, but they
seem to have more credit card debts and cite credit card problems as
their reason for filing bankruptcy more frequently than any other age
group.

29. For elder debtors, the means were $33,995 for definite and $37,076 for
combined definite and probable, and for younger debtors, the means were $22,775
for definite and $25,267 for combined definite and probable (p < 0.001 for each).
Considering only the subset of debtor who answered that they filed bankruptcy
due to overwhelming interest and fees on credit cards, the differences show the
same pattern: elder debtors had a median of $28,075 (mean $29,239) for definite
and $31,622 (mean $43,201) for combined definite and probable credit card debt,
and younger debtors had median of $19,034 (mean $27,885) for definite and
$22,024 (mean $31,112) combined definite and probable credit card debt. These
median differences also were highly significant: p < 0.001 for definite and p < 0.001
for combined definite and probable (p < 0.001 for each mean).
30. The Flynn and Bermant series of studies all show this disproportionate
trend, with credit card debt rising as a function of age. See Flynn & Bermant, supra
note 8; Flynn & Bermant, supra note 11; Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21. The 2002
paper shows the over-age-sixty cohort as holding five times as much credit card
debt as filers under age twenty-five and that the credit card debt constituted over
seventy-five percent of general unsecured debt. Flynn & Bermant, supra note 8, at
28–29. The 2004 paper estimates it at four times as much (using age sixty-five as a
cutoff). Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21, at 74.
31. According to the Survey of Consumer Finance 2007 Chartbook, the median credit card balance (for cardholding households) whose head of household
was between age sixty-five and seventy-four was $3000. SURVEY OF CONSUMER
FINANCE, 2007 SCF CHARTBOOK 1160 (2007), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/Pubs/OSS/oss2/2007/2007%20SCF%20Chartbook.pdf.
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FIGURE 2

Median Credit Card Debt, by Age
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IV. Why Credit Cards for Elder Debtors?
Finding that elder filers are disproportionately citing overwhelming interest and fees on credit cards as reasons for filing bankruptcy and carrying such high credit card balances invites speculation
over why this is so. That is, if we assume credit cards are not marketed disproportionately to people age sixty-five and over, then it
must be something about the debtors themselves that makes them rely
inordinately upon credit cards, and to their own peril. As one prior
study laments in discussing another’s finding that credit card debt
amongst elder debtors who file Chapter 7 bankruptcy seems to be
growing the fastest, “No explanation is given as to why the older deb-
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tors incurred the most credit card debt . . . .” Researchers, however,
are now starting to try. For example, a project conducted by the National Consumer Law Center has gathered some qualitative data on
33
the rise in elder credit card debt generally. Consequently, the time is
ripe to use survey data on bankruptcy filers to enhance our understanding of this unsettling trend.
There are several possible reasons why we might expect to see
elder borrowers particularly drawn to credit cards. First, credit card
reliance could stem from incompetence or lack of sophistication.
Cognitive and other frailties might lead elder borrowers to fall victim
to what some have called the “tricks and traps” model of consumer
credit card lending, becoming lost in the dizzying barrage of small
print contractual provisions that others may be able to parse with
34
greater sophistication. Alternatively, the difference could stem from
strategy or profligacy. It could be that elder debtors are more cunning
than their younger peers, knowing that they can load up profligate
expenses on credit cards and then discharge these unsecured debts in
a bankruptcy filing. A third possible reason could be anonymity or
covering. It could be that elder borrowers are drawn to the quasisecrecy that credit card borrowing accords: debtors with a revolving
credit balance are able to borrow (albeit it at a comparatively expensive rate) by running a balance without telling their families or
friends. Still another possibility is social or financial isolation. Perhaps bankrupt elders are relying on credit cards more than others
32

32. Golmant & Ulrich, supra note 9, at 53–54.
33. DEANNE LOONIN, JULIA DEVANTHERY & STEVE TRIPOLI, NAT’L CONSUMER
LAW CTR., THE LIFE AND DEBT CYCLE: PART ONE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF RISING
CREDIT CARD DEBT AMONG OLDER CONSUMERS (2006) [hereinafter NCLC PART
ONE]; DEANNE LOONIN & JULIA DEVANTHERY, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE
LIFE AND DEBT CYCLE: PART TWO: FINDING HELP FOR OLDER CONSUMERS WITH
CREDIT CARD DEBT (2006) [hereinafter NCLC PART TWO]. The studies analyze
elder legal services users and find a variety of sociological forces at work in elder
financial distress, including lack of financial sophistication, a strong repayment
ethic, and aggressive creditor conduct.
34. Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products Regulation:
Before the H. Comm. on Financial Serv., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Elizabeth
Warren, Chair, Cong. Oversight Panel) (explaining that “giant lenders ‘compete’
for business by talking about nominal interest rates, free gifts, and warm feelings,
but the fine print hides the things that really rake in the cash. Today’s business
model is about making money through tricks and traps.”); see also NCLC PART
ONE, supra note 33, at 6 (reporting legal services director in West Virginia describing the “very low” level of financial sophistication of clients, especially elderly
women: “some of them still think there are debtors’ prisons”).
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simply because they do not have access to alternative forms of credit
and are using cards as funds of last resort. This list of four possible
reasons—incompetence/unsophistication, strategy/profligacy, anonymity/covering, or social/financial isolation—does not purport to be
comprehensive, and surely some reasons are capable of overlapping
with others. Fortunately, the survey instruments of the CBP allow us
to report further findings that engage some of these conjectures. They
are now reported, as categorized by these possible explanatory hypotheses.
A.

Incompetence/Unsophistication

Self-report instruments present challenges in assessing mental
competence. The question, “Are you too incompetent to handle your
own credit cards?” is unlikely to generate reliable data (although, to
be sure, the respondents of our surveys cover a range of highly personal subject matter with what is believed to be a strong level of can35
dor). Direct data of age effects on financial competence are thus difficult to gather, at least through self-report methodologies like
surveys. That said, some creative researchers have made strides using
alternative designs. One recent study, for example, analyzes credit
reports and credit card usage patterns to conclude that financial acuity
36
peaks in middle age and then declines in the senior years, and
another uses a financial literacy test module for the University of
Michigan’s 2008 Health and Retirement Study to find diminishing li37
teracy by age (on a dismal baseline). But direct self-report data remain a tall order. The CBP’s methodology, however, does allow us to
glean insight from indirect measures of financial competence.
As an example of an indirect measure of financial competence,
one question on the CBP questionnaire asked debtors whether being

35. See, e.g., Himmelstein et al., supra note 22.
36. See SUMIT AGARWAL ET AL., THE AGE OF REASON: FINANCIAL DECISIONS
OVER THE LIFE CYCLE WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATION 51(2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=973790 (finding elder—and
younger—credit card users made more “mistakes,” such as paying higher credit
card fees and interest rates than they were otherwise required under the circumstance, than middle-aged users).
37. Half of respondents cannot correctly answer two simple questions on inflation and interest rates. See Annamaria Lusardi et al., Financial Literacy and Financial Sophistication Among Older Americans 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15469, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15469.
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“tricked by creditors” was a reason for filing bankruptcy. The data do
not reveal an age effect: 15.0% of younger filers indicated they filed
because they felt they had been tricked by creditors, which was in fact
slightly more (but not significantly so statistically) than the 11.3% of
elder filers who so answered.
Perhaps a better approach than measuring “competence” might
be to gauge what could be called debtor financial “sophistication.”
On the CBP questionnaire, debtors were asked whether before bankruptcy they requested creditors to work with them on their payments,
which is a plausible proxy for financial sophistication (or at least fortitude). Here, we do see elder respondents diverge from their younger
counterparts. For elders, only 37.8% replied yes, they had asked their
creditors to work with them, which was statistically significantly low38
er than the 60.0% of younger filers who did so (p < 0.01). (See Figure
3.)

38. We also asked debtors if they had attempted to consolidate their debt. Of
filers who had at least one credit card, 36.3% of younger filers replied that they
did, compared with 30.7% of elder filers, a difference that was statistically significant (p < 0.026). For all debtors, 34.4% of young filers and 30.0% of elder filers attempted to consolidate their debt, a difference that was not statistically significant.
Interestingly, while more than half of the elder debtors reported being contacted
by debt collectors (58.0%), that number was significantly lower than the younger
debtors who had been so contacted (84.5%) (p < 0.001). Perhaps it is the need to
respond to the hectoring of debt collectors that prompts younger debtors to initiate
negotiation discussions. This interpretation might paint debt collectors as serving
a salutary function of prompting discussion. On the other hand, by several metrics, the elder respondents were less likely than their younger counterparts to cite
pressure from debt collectors as a reason for filing. For example, only 34.9% of
elder written questionnaire respondents cited pressure from debt collectors as a
reason for filing, compared with 47.6% of their younger counterparts, a difference
that is highly significant (p < 0.001). Additionally, 55.8% of elder phone survey
respondents reported that pressure from debt collectors was either very much or
somewhat a reason for filing, compared with 79.6% of younger filers (p < 0.001).
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FIGURE 3
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Renegotiation Requests, by Age
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Source: Author's calculation of 2007 CBP data.

Thus, one sees some data, albeit indirect, suggesting elder debtors who end up in bankruptcy are just not as sophisticated financially
as their younger peers in terms of negotiating with creditors. But the
most striking difference along age lines in this area is the number of
credit cards bankrupt elders held. In the two years before filing for
bankruptcy, 18.2% of younger debtors held no credit cards, while only
10.3% of elder debtors had none. Even more strikingly, 32.4% of
younger debtors held five or more credit cards, while 44.8% of elder
39
debtors held that many. (See Figure 4.)

39. Significance: p < 0.01 for no credit cards; p < 0.001 for five or more cards,
on proportion distribution (prtest).

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010

15

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 17 [2010]

234
FIGURE 4

Credit Card Penetration, by Age

Percent

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

44.8
32.4
18.2

10.3

(N=162) (N=18)

(N=289) (N=78)

Had No Credit Cards

Held Five or More Credit
Cards

(p<0.01)

(p<0.001)

Under 65
Source: Author's calculation of 2007

Again, one must be cautious in interpreting these data. If
drowning in an excessive number of credit cards reveals a lack of financial sophistication, then these data contribute another indicator
suggesting bankrupt elders may be less sophisticated financially. On
the other hand, an opposite narrative is plausible: that the large number of credit cards held by elder debtors reveals their adroit ability to
juggle numerous cards, transferring balances from one to the other
with high sophistication. The proper inference cannot be conclusively
determined, which is why triangulation with other data is necessary.
Given that in the self-report questionnaire, more bankrupt elders
blame credit card interest and fees as the source of their demise than
any other reason, it is likely the multiplicity of cards shows less, not
more, financial sophistication.
B.

Strategy/Profligacy

Many have opined that credit cards accord special opportunity
for abuse by allowing consumers the chance to run up large balances—constrained only by minimum monthly payments and account
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limits—with unsecured loans that are generally capable of complete
40
discharge in bankruptcy. Could it be that the elder group’s disproportionate self-report of credit card bankruptcies reveals a generational difference in profligate spending? At the outset, the irony of this
possibility should be noted, as some previous studies addressing
bankruptcy stigma rely upon age as a proxy for positive moral charac41
ter. Could elders have less shame and hence be more willing to exploit credit cards?
The debate on the role of stigma in bankruptcy is as well rehearsed and as lengthy as the discussion of its methodological chal42
lenges.
The CBP nevertheless attempted some direct measure of
bankruptcy stigma by asking respondents the degree of embarrassment they had associated with their filings. Those results show not
only a robust continued role of bankruptcy’s stigma, but no appreciable age difference. Filers of all ages reported being mortified at having had to file: 50.9% of elder filers and 52.1% of younger filers reported being “very much” embarrassed to file, and an additional
29.5% of elder filers and 30.5% of younger filers reported being
“somewhat” embarrassed to file. Thus, the elders were equally embarrassed, just as they reported being equally “scared” at having to
file: 53.5% of elder filers and 56.1% of younger filers reported being
“very much” scared to file, and 28.7% of elder filers and 29.7% of
43
younger filers reported being “somewhat scared” to file. (See Figure
5.) Even trying to proxy for other signs of profligacy, one is still una-

40. See Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999
BYU L. REV. 177, 206; Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1534 (2005).
41. E.g., F.H. Buckley & Margaret Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 187, 200–05 (1998). How empirically supported this assumption is remains
questionable. Indeed, one recent survey found that seventy-three percent of respondents age sixty-five or over characterized a television as a “necessity” compared with fifty-three percent of respondents aged eighteen to twenty-nine. See
PEW RESEARCH CTR., LUXURY OR NECESSITY? THINGS WE CAN’T LIVE WITHOUT:
THE LIST HAS GROWN IN THE PAST DECADE 11 (2007).
42. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook,
Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV. 213, 215 (2006).
43. Similarly, 88.9% of young respondents and 87.3% of elder respondents
reported being “relieved” at filing. Interestingly, the relief seemed to provide bigger respite for the elder debtors: while “only” 62.3% of elder respondents reported
being currently stressed about their finances (at the time of their telephone interviews, i.e., well after they filed for bankruptcy relief), 72.1% of the younger filers
were already stressed again.
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ble to support an inference that elder debtors are more morally lax
than others. They seem to purchase lottery tickets and frequent casi44
nos at the same rate as their younger cohorts in bankruptcy. Indeed,
the debtors sampled in the CBP as a whole do not seem to indulge in
these free-spending pastimes any more often than their non-bankrupt
45
peers. One might be inclined to conclude that such data would help
retire the “loose morals” myth regarding the typical bankruptcy deb46
tor, but such myth is likely to prove long-lived. Consequently, the
increased credit card usage of elder debtors does not seem part of a
grand scheme of age-dependent fraud.

44. The elder response rates to these questions mirror the CBP population
responses as a whole. See infra note 45.
45. About half visited casinos in the past year, the same as in the Detroit Area
Household Financial Services Study (a study of moderate- and low-income general
households in the Detroit area), although this comparison should perhaps be qualified by Detroit’s geographic proximity to numerous casinos. For an overview of
this study, see Michael Barr, Detroit Area Study on Financial Services (Overview),
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~msbarr/detroit_area_study.html (last visited
Apr. 19, 2011). Additionally, 56.5% did not buy lottery tickets in the year before
their bankruptcy, 24.2% did so a few times per year, 7.7% did so about once a
month, 9.0% did so about once a week, and only 2.7% did so almost daily.
46. The Canadian study of bankruptcy filers over age fifty-five found ninetyeight percent reported that it was difficult to tell family and friends about their filing, some discussing at length their feelings of shame, fear and humiliation. See
Sarra, supra note 13, at 810.
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FIGURE 5

Emotional Response to Bankruptcy, by Age
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Source: Author's calculation of 2007 CBP data

Note the deliberate conflation of two related but analytically distinct grounds for reliance on credit cards in this discussion of strategy
and profligacy. The first is invidious conduct: strategic behavior and
the concomitant immunity from shame revealed by use of credit cards
with no intention to repay. Here we see no age differences in the reported instrument measures trying to proxy for shamelessness. The
second ground is what might be better considered “morally lazy”
conduct: profligate use of credit cards, not because of premeditated
financial fraud, but because of impulse control shortcomings. Assuming, only arguendo, that credit card balances serve as a proxy for profligate spending, then perhaps elder people have more difficulty controlling their spending urges than younger debtors.
Without getting sidetracked on whether such a trait is more
properly classified as a value-neutral “competence” problem (and
hence belongs in the previous section’s discussion on sophistication)
or as a value-laden “personal failing” (and hence properly belongs in
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this discussion of strategic and profligate conduct), I simply present
the apposite data from the CBP. One of the self-reported reasons for
filing bankruptcy that respondents could specifically choose was
“problems controlling spending.” Over a quarter of the debtors sampled by the CBP admitted that this was at least one of their problems
leading to the need to file bankruptcy. This was not the most frequently selected reason, or even one of the top five reasons, but the
considerable number of people admitting that self-control issues
caused financial failure ought to dampen fears of a self-serving bias
48
amongst respondents.
This question, ironically, is one area where
the elder respondents diverged from their younger colleagues: whereas almost a third of younger respondents (28.6%) cited spending
control problems as a reason for filing bankruptcy, less than a quarter
(22.6%) of the elder respondents did so (p < 0.02). (See Figure 6.) Accordingly, reliance on credit cards seems less linked to spendthrift
conduct with elder debtors, suggesting other causal factors must be at
work in explaining the elder credit card phenomenon.
47

47. Far from suggesting personal weakness or laziness, the overwhelming
majority of respondents felt filing bankruptcy was “the responsible thing to do.”
In fact, elder respondents reported “struggling” with their debts before filing
bankruptcy for a shorter period of time than younger debtors (30.0% vs. 40.0% (p <
0.01)), which, coupled with the high rate of elder debtors who believed filing was
the responsible decision, could lead to the conclusion that the elder debtors were
quicker to own up to failure and take what was perceived as the responsible path.
48. See Thorne, supra note 15, at 194–200.
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FIGURE 6

Spending Control Issues, by Age
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Anonymity/Covering

Another possibility for increased reliance on credit cards by
elder debtors is the inherent anonymity of the credit product. Unlike
a traditional bank loan that requires sitting down with a banker, or a
lifeline from a family member that requires an awkward conversation,
revolving credit card balances are effectively at the election of the borrower. Up to the credit limit, the debtor can charge daily consumption items in times of cash flow shortfall without turning to external
sources for help. Why might this be of relevance to elder borrowers?
Sociologists have for some time noted that elder persons are especially
disinclined to seek help for a complex variety of reasons. For example, Elizabeth Moen describes the “non-acceptor syndrome,” and
49
finds that “the elderly are quite reluctant to seek or accept help.”
She further finds that this disinclination to seek assistance varies as a

49. Elizabeth Moen, The Reluctance of the Elderly to Accept Help, 25 SOC. PROBS.
293, 295–96, 302 (1978).
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function of the degree it requires the person to make an acknowledgement of failure, such that “assistance or services perceived as
earned or available to all elderly are the most acceptable, while those
50
that require a public declaration of poverty are the least acceptable.”
A leading sociology authority similarly concludes: “Because of personal pride and a desire to remain independent, many elderly people
51
hide financial problems, even from their own families.” Qualitative
52
data confirm these assessments, and many of the elder debtors articulated this sentiment in the phone interviews. As one elder debtor
captured it, “I didn’t want people to know we filed bankruptcy, because they would look at me a different way. To this day, nobody
knows. I thought it was a loser that had to do that.” These sociological observations suggest that the attraction of credit cards may indeed
be heightened for elder consumers in financial distress, and the data
from the CBP lend some support.
In response to the question of how comfortable they would be
borrowing money from family and friends, fewer than a quarter of the
elder CBP respondents answered that they would be somewhat or
very comfortable (23.1%), whereas more than a third of younger respondents (36.1%) would be somewhat or very comfortable (p < 0.001).
This in turn may explain why when asked how they coped with their
financial distress before filing for bankruptcy, the elders again “underperformed” their younger debtor colleagues in asking friends and
family for assistance, by 35.2% to 68.7%—less than half as likely to do
so (p < 0.001). Similarly, only 2.9% of elder debtors tried to cope by
asking for help from charities or churches, compared with 10.8% of
younger debtors (p < 0.001). (See Figure 7.)
Finally, and perversely, not only do the elder debtors appear
disproportionately loath to ask for assistance from others—perhaps
preferring the secrecy of the credit card—they also disproportionately
try to help other family members facing their own financial problems.
One of the reasons for filing bankruptcy respondents could choose on
the CBP questionnaire was “tried to help family/friends.” Elder debtors listed this as a cause in 22.3% of cases; younger filers only did so

50. Id. at 302.
51. JOHN J. MACIONIS, SOCIOLOGY 405 (11th ed. 2007).
52. See generally NCLC PART TWO, supra note 33, passim (reporting on, inter
alia, field interviews with elder assistance programs and clients).
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for 15.9% (p < 0.002). In fact, in the interview portion of the phone
survey, several elder debtors expressed frustration at their decisions
to help family. One debtor said she was angry “that our kids could
54
make us get into that situation,” and another said he was angry be55
cause “I felt very betrayed by my sons.”
53

FIGURE 7

Asking for Help, by Age
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D.

Social/Financial Isolation

The data in the previous section suggest that bankrupt elders
might be drawn to credit cards in order to avoid asking people for
help as a way of coping with financial distress. This in turn raises
another question: is the disinclination to ask for help animated by
psychosocial preference, or is it compelled by lack of access to a sup53. Anonymous interview with Debtor E_451D (date of interview on file in
project archive).
54. Anonymous interview with Debtor E_195R (date of interview on file in
project archive).
55. Anonymous interview with Debtor E_072O (date of interview on file in
project archive).
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port network? In other words, it could be that elder debtors would be
delighted to ask for help, but they simply have fewer supporters to
seek out (or, more precisely, fewer financially relevant supporters to
56
seek out). Again, the CBP findings shed light. Apart from the question of how comfortable debtors would be asking for financial help
from family or friends, a separate question asked, “Could you borrow
from family and friends if needed?” While two-thirds of younger
debtors responded that they could (66.3%), substantially fewer elders
(57.7%) said they could, a difference that is statistically significant (p <
57
0.01). (See Figure 8.) Perhaps relatedly, the demographic information on the CBP bankrupt population shows them as less likely to be
58
married and more likely to be divorced than the general population.

56. This qualification is added because these findings cannot distinguish between elders who lack support networks altogether (have no friends/family) and
elders who have emotional support networks but lack financial support networks
(have family/friends, but who are themselves all tapped out financially).
57. In the Canadian study of bankruptcy filers over age fifty-five, seventyfour percent said it would have been helpful if they could have talked to someone
about their financial problems prior to filing bankruptcy. See Sarra, supra note 13,
at 811.
58. The general population data show approximately fifty-four percent of
people are married (compared with forty-four percent of CBP debtors) and approximately nine percent are divorced (compared with twenty-five percent of CBP
debtors). Interestingly, about three in ten individuals age sixty-five and older in
both the general population and the CBP pool were widowed. See U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2006 tbl.A1 (2006),
available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam/cps
2006.html.
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FIGURE 8

Financial Support Network, byAge
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When asked questions specifically designed to uncover whether
they were using credit cards to hide debts from otherwise availableto-help families and friends, however, the respondents’ age did not
59
reveal meaningful differences.
For example, when asked whether
they were worried they would be a burden on family or friends if they
discussed their financial problems, both elder and younger debtors
60
were equally split regarding their concern.
Similarly, when asked
whether they thought revealing financial distress would make family
members doubt the debtors’ financial abilities, respondents showed
no discernible differences based on age (with about half worrying
61
about this). Thus, it is not clear whether the reliance on credit cards

59. It is of course impossible to exclude denial as an explanation for the elder
response rates.
60. Fifty-four percent of elder debtors were somewhat or strongly in agreement, compared with sixty-two percent of younger debtors (ns).
61. Fifty-five percent of elder debtors were somewhat or strongly in agreement, compared with fifty-four percent of younger debtors (ns). This was apparently a false worry on behalf of the respondents: elder debtors reported less harm
to family relationships as a result of filing than younger debtors. In response to a
question whether family relationships were damaged by the bankruptcy filing,
12.0% of elder debtors reported damage while 20.7% of younger debtors reported
damage, a difference that is statistically significant (p < 0.03).
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is animated by secrecy or simply because credit cards are the easiest
form of accessible credit.
One is, therefore, hesitant to overstate the findings of social isolation. Yes, it does seem that the elder bankruptcy debtors have fewer
resources, but that could simply be compounding a pre-existing problem of secrecy—or pride—alluded to in the previous section. It is one
thing to find that elder debtors are no more worried than younger
debtors regarding assessments of their competence in revealing their
financial distress to others. That does not suggest heightened reliance
on credit cards to hide debts from family. But it is quite another to
find that the elder debtors are less likely than younger ones to turn to
charities and churches, which surely do not discriminate based on
age. That reluctance does suggest an attitudinal mechanism at
work—possibly resulting from stubbornness, pride, denial, or a different repayment ethic. The data thus reveal the complexity of the is62
sue; certainly more than one force is at work.

V. Elder Financial Collapse: Funding a Structural
Deficit?
The descriptive financial data of the elder debtors suggest that
they are poorer than other bankruptcy filers. Although bankruptcy
filers on the whole are poorer than the general population (having
63
lower incomes, higher debt loads, etc.), the elder filers are dispropor64
tionately poorer than the younger filers—the poorest of the poor.
The monthly income of the elder debtors is lower than that of the
younger ones, taking into account all sources of income, with a difference that is statistically significant (highly so): $2304 for the younger

62. One interesting finding from the Canadian study was that some elder filers reported “loneliness” as a reason for taking up economically destructive activities (e.g., gambling), which forty percent attributed as playing a causal role in their
bankruptcies. See Sarra, supra note 13, at 810.
63. Sullivan et al., supra note 42, at 222.
64. Life-cycle consumption enthusiasts will be quick to point out that elders
“should” be poorer (more precisely, that their comparative impecunity is not
troubling), because they have fewer consumption needs. That is, of course, true to
a point but does not help answer the question why the elder bankruptcy ranks are
swelling. It could be that the elder debtors, while having fewer consumption
needs, are falling below an income floor required to meet even those lower needs
and hence are turning to credit cards maladaptively for income supplementation.
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debtors compared with $1940 for the elder debtors (p < 0.001).
While elder debtors have lower monthly incomes than younger debtors, their total unsecured debt is about the same. The median unsecured debt owed by elder debtors is $33,270, while the median owed
by younger debtors is $32,723, underscoring the important role that
66
credit card debt must be playing in elders’ unsecured debt loads.
Finally, as a distress ratio, the median elder unsecured debt-to-income
ratio is 1.5 (mean 2.2), while the median younger debt-to-income ratio
67
is 1.2 (mean 2.0), a difference that was highly statistically significant.
This finding of comparative poorness raises the issue of covariance: the fact that we see elder debtors carrying more credit card
debt and blaming credit cards for filing bankruptcy more than their
younger cohorts could be a function of their comparatively poorer position. Thus, age could be a co-variate of “poor” such that either factor predicts credit-card-based reasons for filing bankruptcy. A logit
regression, however, shows that the probability of filing bankruptcy
due to overwhelming interest and fees on credit cards increases if one
68
is elderly, even when controlling for income.
This suggests that
there is something about age qua age, not just age as a proxy for poorness, at work.
Background data on employment motivations augment the view
69
that these elder debtors in bankruptcy are in tough economic straits.
A little more than one-third of elder CBP filers reported that they had
70
retired but then returned to the workforce. When asked why they
were working or seeking employment, only 35.9% reported it was for
65

65. Means: elder = $2248; younger = $2640, p < 0.001. The median total assets
for younger filers was $50,885, compared with $43,511 for the elders—lower, but
not statistically significant in light of the wide dispersion of asset levels. Means:
elder = $89,265; younger = $102,369, ns.
66. Means: elder = $50,773; younger = $48,519, ns.
67. Note that one study actually finds credit card debt increases with income.
See Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21, at 20 (finding a discontinuous “jump” at zero
income to higher levels of credit card debt).
68. Controlling for assets did not change the logit findings, an unsurprising
result given that assets were insignificantly correlated with age. See supra note 65.
69. See Clare Ansberry, Elderly Emerge as a New Class of Workers—and the Jobless, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009, at A1 (reporting rising trend of elders needing to
return to or remain in the workforce to make ends meet).
70. Although one might expect many elders to be retired, twenty-three percent responded that they coped with their financial problems before bankruptcy
by looking for more work. In addition, almost fifty percent of elders selected “loss
of income” as a reason for filing bankruptcy (although this was fewer than the
younger debtors who did so).
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love of work; 74.4% candidly admitted it was because they needed
money to cover everyday expenses; and 18.0% explicitly said it was to
earn money to pay for health care and medical expenses, with 15.4%
71
also saying it was to get health insurance benefits.
Going back to
work seems a necessity for many of these elder debtors, and the qualitative interview data reflect that it is not easy. As one debtor lamented, “It’s hard out here at seventy-one trying to make a living.
Hope you don’t have to file bankruptcy at seventy-one and still try to
72
work.”
These findings further support the concern that the swelling
ranks of elder Americans filing bankruptcy are running out of money,
and the picture is not pretty for those that do. For example, 9.7% report having gone without food while struggling before bankruptcy,
31.2% report being late on rent or mortgage, 31.2% report going without required medication (47.1% for the subset who filed bankruptcy
for medical reasons), and 21.2% report skipping doctors’ appoint73
ments (30.6% for the subset who filed for medical reasons). Thus,
one of the most sobering findings of the CBP data may be this stark
fact: although all bankrupt debtors are in tough financial straits, the
elder filers are in incredibly tough straits—an ominous portent of
74
what may await the baby boomers. Whether this relates to the esca75
lating costs of health care is certainly a possibility, as is the prospect
76
that the abolition of the defined-benefit pension plan plays a role.

71. Interestingly, of the elder respondents, 64.4% reported having a “Medigap” health insurance policy to cover at least some medical expenses unpaid by
Medicare.
72. Anonymous interview with Debtor E_2308 (date of interview on file in
project archive).
73. Although elder debtors answered these questions affirmatively at generally lower rates than younger filers, the absolute number of elder debtors experiencing financial privations was striking.
74. For a study of low- and moderate-income consumers’ increasing reliance
on credit cards to fund living necessities, see TAMARA DRAUT ET AL., DEMOS &
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, THE PLASTIC SAFETY NET: THE REALITY BEHIND
DEBT IN AMERICA—FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY OF CREDIT
CARD DEBT AMONG LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS (2005), available at
http://ww.demos.org/pubs/PSN_low.pdf.
75. See Medical Debt: Is Our Healthcare System Bankrupting Americans?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 56 (2009) (statement of John A. E. Pottow, Professor of Law, University of Michigan).
76. Employer-sponsored “Medigap” insurance policies as a retirement benefit
fell from sixty-six percent of employers in 1988 to thirty-eight percent in 2003.
HEATHER C. MCGHEE & TAMARA DRAUT, RETIRING IN THE RED, THE GROWTH OF
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It may also simply be the financial shock of retirement itself that
77
elder Americans are ill-suited to face. Recent data show credit counseling applicants citing “retirement” as a cause of financial distress
78
among 5.4% of respondents. Given only 9.4% of respondents categorized themselves as retired, this suggests that retirement has required pre-bankruptcy credit counseling for more than half of reti79
rees.
Further exploration of these conjectures must await future
study. The relevant observation for now is that credit cards may be a
short-term (and ultimately unsuccessful) financing solution for the
80
elder debtors to a structural financial deficit.
If Americans cannot
live out their senior years, even with Medicare, on their current incomes without relying on credit cards and then going bankrupt, the
findings of this study may provide early evidence of a deep societal
81
problem of overindebtedness.
DEBT AMONG OLDER AMERICANS 56 (2004), available at http://archive.demos.org/
pubs/retiring_2ed.pdf. Ominously, one recent study shows that the poverty rate
is six times higher in elder households that do not have pension income. FRANK
PORELL & BETH ALMEIDA, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC., THE PENSION FACTOR:
ASSESSING THE ROLE OF DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS IN REDUCING ELDER HARDSHIPS 17
(2009), available at http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/pension_
factor_web.pdf.
77. The National Consumer Law Center styles retirement as a “trigger” or
“shock” that can push elder consumers barely managing their credit card minimum payments “over the edge.” NCLC PART ONE, supra note 33, at 8.
78. LINFIELD, supra note 8, at 14.
79. Id. at 10–11.
80. One encouraging finding is that elder respondents reported better results
on whether bankruptcy helped them. For example, “only” 33.1% of elder filers
said they were currently (i.e., at the time of their phone interviews, well after they
filed bankruptcy) still struggling with bills, as opposed to an astonishing 54.2% of
younger filers. Still, “only” is in quotation marks, because it is equally sobering
that one-third of “fresh start” elders with a bankruptcy discharge are still struggling with bills. As for medical bills, 40.7% responded they were still having
trouble with medical bills after bankruptcy, which was actually better than the
59.6% of younger respondents (but still higher than the general level of those
struggling for their age group).
81. Much research has emerged on the deteriorating financial circumstances
of American seniors. For example, logistic regressions on the 2000 Health and Retirement Study find age 65–74 as a predictive variable of both consumer and mortgage debt. Yoon G. Lee, Jean M. Lown & Deanna L. Sharpe, Predictors of Holding
Consumer and Mortgage Debt Among Older Americans, 28 J. FAM. ECON. ISSUES 305,
317 (2007). Other researchers have even designed a “National Retirement Risk Index.” See, e.g., Richard W. Johnson, Barbara A. Butrica & Corina Mommaerts, Work
and Retirement Patterns for the G.I. Generation, Silent Generation, and Early Boomers:
Thirty Years of Change (Ctr. for Ret. Research, Working Paper No. 2010–8, 2010),
available at http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Working_Papers/wp_2010-8.pdf.
One strand of this elder financial distress research supports the idea of reliance on
housing debt in particular as a hole-plugging strategy. See, e.g., George S. Masnick,
Zhu Xiao Di & Eric S. Belsky, Emerging Cohort Trends in Housing Debt and Home Equity (Harvard Univ. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, Working Paper No. 05-1, 2005),
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VI. Beyond Credit Cards: Medical Bankruptcy and Elder
Americans
The CBP data on elder debtors suggest a strong and increasing
role of credit cards in bankruptcy filings, which may reveal a number
of influences at work. The large role of credit cards, however, should
not eclipse other reasons for the run-up in elder bankruptcies, such as
medical causes. The subject of medical bankruptcies has been ad82
dressed elsewhere, including in earlier reports of the CBP data, and
83
Congress has already held hearings on the matter.
A brief detour
into this domain seems appropriate, however, because the senior
population may be taking a disproportionate hit from medical bankruptcies. For example, 59.1% of elder respondents to the CBP survey
said that they changed their lifestyles before bankruptcy to help afford
84
medical bills (significantly more than the 47.9% of younger filers).
Defining “medical bankruptcy” is an issue that has prompted
both scholarly and political debate that is unnecessary to revisit
85
here. Briefly stated, prior studies using the CBP data employ an aggregate approach to defining medical bankruptcy. For example, the
clearest instance of a medical bankruptcy would be if someone seavailable at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/w05-1.pdf (general analysis of rising housing debt of elder Americans); William C. Apgar & Zhu
Xiao Di, Housing Wealth and Retirement Savings: Enhancing Financial Security for Older Americans 5 (Harv. Univ. Joint Ctr. For Hous. Studies, Working Paper No. 05-8,
2005), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/w05-8.pdf
(finding mortgage debt had risen from twenty percent of elder consumer debt in
1989 to seventy percent in 2001); id. at 5 tbl.2 (finding elder homeowners still with
a mortgage rose from twenty percent in 1989 to twenty-six percent in 2001); id. at 5
tbl.2 (median mortgage debt tripled for this age demographic to $44,000); see also
MCGHEE & DRAUT, supra note 76, at 1 (finding one-fifth of elder households with
incomes below $50,000 (i.e., seventy percent of them) are in “debt hardship,”
meaning more than forty percent of their income is devoted to debt service).
82. See Himmelstein et al., supra note 5, at 741. An excellent analysis, using
data from an earlier round of the CBP, can be found in Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A.
Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2001).
83. E.g., Medical Debt: Can Bankruptcy Reform Facilitate a Fresh Start?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/get
doc.cgi?dbname=111_senate_hearings&docid=f:56473.pdf.
84. Even though the number of elders was significantly lower than the number of younger debtors answering affirmatively (p < 0.01), almost fifty percent selected “loss of income” as a reason for filing bankruptcy.
85. Medical Debt: Is Our Healthcare System Bankrupting Americans?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 50–60 (2010) (Statement of John A. E. Pottow, Professor of Law, University of Michigan), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers
/111th/111-56_51346.pdf.
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lected “health reasons” as one of the choices on the self-report questionnaire as a reason for filing. But one might additionally define a
medical bankruptcy as one where a debtor had more than a threshold
amount of debt in medical bills (e.g., $5000), or had more than a certain percentage of his or her income in medical debt (e.g., over ten
percent). Another question in the CBP instrument asks homeowners
whether they had to mortgage their houses to cover medical bills. Researchers might also code affirmative responses to this question as a
“medical bankruptcy,” even if, in the debtor’s mind, he or she went
bankrupt because of mortgage foreclosure. Accordingly, it is possible
to think of “narrower” and “broader” definitions of a medical bankruptcy: there is no intrinsically correct one.
Taking a narrow approach—debtors who specifically responded
that a medical reason for them or their spouse led to bankruptcy—
elder filers answered affirmatively in 39.1% of cases (significantly
86
more than the 31.2% of younger debtors (p < 0.002)).
Similarly,
32.6% of elder filers specifically cited medical bills as a cause for filing
87
(compared with 28.9% for younger debtors). (These numbers are not
cumulative, so someone could answer “yes” to both questions.) On
another measure, 30.2% of elder filers spent more than $5000, or ten
percent of their annual household income, on out-of-pocket medical
bills. These numbers employing a narrower metric suggest that medical bankruptcies are an important reason for elders’ filings, but not as
significant as credit cards. On the other hand, taking a broader defini88
tion (matching prior scholarly studies), where a debtor selecting any
one of these alternative metrics of medical bankruptcy qualifies, the
data show 67.3% of elder filers could be linked to a medical bankruptcy—a number almost exactly the same as the amount who cite credit
cards.
The point of reporting these data of medical bankruptcies is not
to weigh in on the debate whether a narrower measure (say, the 39%

86. Jacoby et al., supra note 82, at 397–98 (finding similar response rates from
1999: 46.7% of elder debtors and between 20 to 35% of younger debtors (depending on the age group)). Caution should be used in directly comparing these figures due to methodological differences, though the numbers do seem close enough
to offer at least rough confirmation.
87. This comparison was not statistically significant, perhaps suggesting the
medical problems translate more into lost work or more indirect problems rather
than straight unpaid medical bills for elders.
88. E.g., Himmelstein et al., supra note 5, at 743.
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who simply self-report a reason for filing as “medical”) or a broader
measure (say, the 67% who meet any definition) is more appropriate.
Rather, it is to underscore that medical bankruptcies are highly prevalent in the rapidly growing ranks of elder filers. This stark reality
holds true for a demographic cohort that is supposed to have nearuniversal health insurance coverage through the Medicare program
(and is consistent with surveys conducted outside the bankruptcy
89
realm).
Indeed, 40% of the elder filers in the CBP reported that it
was “very much” or “somewhat” difficult to pay their Medicare premiums and copays.
More important for this Article’s focus on credit cards is the fact
that we have no perfect way of disaggregating a medical “versus” a
90
credit card bankruptcy, as conceded by authors of earlier studies.
Indeed, as the previously reported data on credit cards reveal, one
reason elder debtors may be relying on credit cards is because they
need financing to cover everyday consumption expenses. Thus, there
is no absolute way of knowing whether a credit card bankruptcy is or
91
is not also a medical bankruptcy. Although some initial research is
92
unfolding, much more needs to be done. All our data indicate for
sure is that both credit cards and medical issues are important—the
93
most important—determinants of elder bankruptcy filings.

89. See DRAUT ET AL., supra note 74, at 10 tbl.2 (reporting that twenty-nine
percent of low- and middle-income households surveyed cited illness or necessary
medical expenses as contributing to their current credit card balance).
90. See, e.g., Flynn & Bermant, supra note 21, at 74 n.4 (qualifying rudimentary
estimation of medical debt).
91. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Mirya Holman, Managing Medical Bills on the Brink
of Bankruptcy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 239, 242–43 (2010) (explaining
problems in counting medical bankruptcies and the role credit cards play).
92. See id. at 268–71 (analyzing medical bankruptcy data meticulously and
reconciling lower reported Schedule F medical expenses with significantly higher
spending on medical bills); see also CINDY ZELDIN & MARK RUKAVINA, BORROWING
TO STAY HEALTHY: HOW CREDIT CARD DEBT IS RELATED TO MEDICAL EXPENSES 4
(2007) (estimating $6800 in medical expenses for credit card borrowers over age
sixty-five).
93. We also unearthed a pernicious effect of financial distress on health: nearly two-thirds (66.3%) of respondents—of all age groups—reported that the stress
of their bankruptcies made an existing physical or psychological health problem
worse. This seems consistent with available medical evidence. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Does Indebtedness Influence Health? A Preliminary Inquiry, 30 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 560, 563–64 (2002); see also Patricia Drentea & Paul J. Lavrakas, Over the
Limit: The Association Among Health, Race and Debt, 50 SOC. SCI. & MED. 517 (2000).
Note too that the National Consumer Law Center’s interviews found that
“[c]ounselors repeatedly identified medical cost assistance as one essential ap-
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VII. Discussion
Although the preceding data on elder debtors present a variety
of findings pointing in somewhat different directions, some trends
have emerged. At the outset, we saw that elder debtors cite the interest and fees on credit cards as a reason for filing in a strong majority
of the cases (over two-thirds), reporting this reason with much greater
frequency than younger filers. In analyzing the elder group’s disproportionate use of credit cards, we found no evidence that it is fueled
by comparatively greater social shamelessness; elders reported feeling
embarrassed and reluctant to file bankruptcy in similar proportions to
everyone else. We also found that elder debtors have more credit
cards than the younger filers, suggesting that a greater number of credit cards may pose an increased risk of these credit-card-related bankruptcies. As for why there is so much (deleterious) reliance on credit
cards, the findings become more complex. On the one hand, the data
show some hesitancy by elder debtors to take an assertive role in negotiating with their creditors, perhaps suggesting that they are more
passive and less sophisticated than younger debtors. They also feel
disproportionately uncomfortable asking family, friends, or even
charities for assistance in facing financial distress. On the other hand,
the findings do not show age differences in fears of perception; both
young and old alike are equally worried about what others will think
if they admit their financial distress.
These results suggest that at least part of the elder debtors’ reliance on credit cards may be a disinclination to seek help from others.
They also suggest that this disinclination may be fueled by psychosocial forces driving seniors toward more anonymous forms of financing
like the credit card, as well as, if not even more by, the lack of a support network for financial help in the first place. Furthermore, the
findings of the comparatively worse financial circumstances of elder
debtors imply a two-pronged attack hitting elder Americans who fall
into severe financial distress: first, they have fewer economic resources to weather these downturns, having lower (and presumably
more fixed) incomes than their younger peers; and second, they have
a diminished financial support network to turn to for help in times of
need, having fewer family and friends that they can ask for assistance.
With these socio-economic handicaps, it is unsurprising that credit
proach to reduce the debt problems of elder clients.” NCLC PART TWO, supra note
33, at 15.
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cards are turned to with such frequency. Finally, and perhaps relatedly, one should consider the finding of highly prevalent “medical
bankruptcies” for elder debtors, either at similar or higher rates than
younger bankruptcy filers. With so many elder debtors citing medical
reasons for filing bankruptcy and with the ability to charge medical
expenses to credit cards, one cannot exclude the possibility that a substantial portion of these apparent “credit card bankruptcies” are additionally (or fundamentally) “medical bankruptcies.”
The CBP data analyzed in this Article have allowed considerable
insight into the circumstances of the rapidly growing ranks of elder
bankruptcy filers. This raises the question whether the Bankruptcy
Code is well equipped to handle these elders’ need for financial relief.
Sadly, the answer is negative.
The initial problem is conceptual. The theoretical structure of
the famous “fresh start” in the U.S. consumer bankruptcy system centers on stripping debtors of all but a barebones set of exempt assets
while allowing them to keep unfettered access to their future income,
94
thus incentivizing them to return to work and social productivity.
The model is based upon future earnings as the key to rehabilitation:
in exchange for the bankruptcy discharge, your creditors take away
most of your assets, but you get to keep your future income intact and
95
eventually start to re-accumulate savings and rebuild your life. The
problem with elder filers is two-fold: first, they have less time to rebuild earnings (admittedly while having less time to consume); and
second, they are at a diminished income-earning point in their work-

94. This, of course, is subject to debate, but it is at least one non-contentious
narrative of the policy underlining the income-focused fresh start in the U.S. Code.
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
173, 178 (1987) (“Freeing a debtor’s future earnings provides incentives to bring
the assets into being in the first instance . . . .”). Baird also notes, however, that
“there may be little difference between taking $20,000 from the debtor’s bank account and allowing him to enjoy $50,000 a year income on the one hand, and taking nothing from the bank account and garnishing $10,000 of his wages each year
for two years on the other.” Id. at 178.
95. See, e.g., Thorne et al., supra note 1, at 88 (“Younger people may well have
another thirty years or more in the workforce after their bankruptcy filings, years
in which they can rebuild retirement accounts, pay off mortgages, set aside some
savings, and otherwise reestablish their financial security.”). Recent theoretical
treatment of this conceptualization from an economics perspective can be found in
an interesting working paper by Michelle White. Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy: Insurance, Work Effort, Opportunism and the Efficiency of the ‘Fresh Start’
(May 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~miwhite/bankruptcy-theory-white.pdf.
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lives. Retirees or near-retirees are supposed to rely upon accumulated savings, not future income, to support themselves. Retirement
income is notoriously flat to boot. The bankruptcy system’s parsimonious treatment of savings and its pre-occupation with future income
is poorly suited to an elder debtor. Indeed, the quintessential asset
exemption of “tools of the trade” seems of limited financial help to a
97
retiree.
Paradoxically, the Code does try to accommodate this disconnect
by exempting retirement assets from creditor liquidation, which
would seem to respond to the concern that non-workforce debtors
98
need to be able to keep their savings to fund retirement. The problem, however, is that the data suggest retirement accounts are a luxury of the rich, which means that their protection is of little benefit to
the median bankrupt debtor. The CBP data collected on the retirement account assets scheduled in debtors’ petitions found that the
median debtor reported no assets in his or her retirement accounts. In
fact, even the seventy-fifth percent quartile (i.e., the top twenty-five
percent when ranking by amount of retirement assets scheduled) reported only $300 in total retirement savings. This contrasts with the
general population, where the Survey of Consumer Finances 2007 data indicate that 52.6% of the population has at least some money in a
99
retirement account. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Code’s aspiration
of rehabilitating debtors based on sheltering future income and current retirement assets seems more optimistic than effective—most of
96

96. This does not even consider the requirement that a Chapter 13 debtor requires “regular income.” 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2006).
97. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) (2006). The homestead exemption might provide
more help to elder debtors if we assume that they are more likely to have accrued
equity in their homes by paying off mortgages over time. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).
General population data, however, show an increasing number of elder Americans
still carrying mortgages on their homes. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING
SURVEY, tbl.3-15 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing
/ahs/ahs07/ahs07.html.
98. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(d)(12), 541(b)(5) (2006). Although, as pointed out
decades ago, there is no intrinsic reason why general savings accounts do not
serve the same retirement income-replacement function as a specially designated
pension account. Daniel L. Skoler, The Elderly and Bankruptcy Relief: Problems, Protections, and Realities, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 120, 127–28 (1989).
99. BRIAN K. BUCKS ET AL., FED. RESERVE, CHANGES IN U.S. FAMILY FINANCES
FROM 2004 TO 2007: EVIDENCE FROM THE SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES A23
(2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2009/pdf/
scf09.pdf.
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these people have spent down their retirement savings already, as100
suming they even had any to begin with.

VIII. Recommendations
So what can be done? If future income protection and retirement
asset exemption are insufficient to meet the needs of the rising ranks
of seniors filing for bankruptcy, what can the law do? Possible solutions exist both inside and outside the bankruptcy system. Using the
Bankruptcy Code, the law could target the specific financial problems
faced by elder debtors. For example, the restrictions on discharging
credit card debt could be relaxed (which would reverse BAPCPA’s
101
seemingly misguided innovation of increasing their severity).
Similarly, recent congressional reform targeting medical bankruptcies for
streamlined treatment could be followed, which again would reduce
102
the burden on the increasing number of elder debtors.
A more creative idea might be to offer age-specific relief, which many jurisdictions
103
do in according elder residents lower tax rates.
Indeed, several
104
states have exemption laws that are expressly age-specific.
Perhaps
recognition of the limited earning potential of elder debtors militates

100. See Eleanor Laise, Tapped Out: Pinched Consumers Scramble for Cash, WALL
ST. J., June 2, 2008, at A1 (documenting raiding of retirement accounts by distressed consumers coping with the financial meltdown).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (2006). I am ignoring potential supply-side effects
largely out of skepticism they will have meaningful ex ante impact.
102. See Medical Bankruptcy Fairness Act of 2009, S. 1624, 111th Cong. (2009).
103. See, e.g., DETROIT, MICH., ORDINANCES § 18-10-9 (2009) (municipal income
tax exemption for certain taxpayers over age sixty-four); N.Y.C., N.Y., N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE § 11-245.3 (2009) (real property tax exemptions for certain taxpayers
aged sixty-five and older). It is also true at state levels. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 59, § 5 (2010) (real property tax exemption for certain taxpayers over age
seventy); MO. REV. STAT. § 137.106 (2009) (property tax exemption for certain taxpayers aged sixty-five and older).
104. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 487.010, § 704.710-730 (West 2009) (different
homestead laws for debtors aged fifty-five and older and for debtors aged sixtyfive and older); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-201-212 (2007) (different homestead laws
for debtors aged sixty-five and older); HAW. REV. STAT. § 651:91-96 (2007) (different homestead laws for debtors aged sixty-five and older); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 4422 (2003) (different homestead laws for debtors aged sixty and older);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188, § 1.A (2010) (different homestead laws for debtors
aged sixty-two and older); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-45-3 (2004) (different exemption laws for debtors aged seventy and older).
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There
in favor of higher property exemptions for their age group.
106
are myriad possibilities creative minds can envision.
These are all useful devices for within-bankruptcy reform, but
the most striking findings of this analysis have been the hopelessness
of the elder debtor. If seniors have fewer friends to turn to for help
with financial distress, it seems difficult to mandate by legislation
more friends. Rather, the underlying causes of the financial distress
107
need redress.
Thus, if, for example, medical bankruptcies are sinking elder debtors, then perhaps reforming the health care system is a
more efficacious social intervention. Similarly, if reliance on credit
cards is driven by insufficient support networks, then maybe public
lending programs, such as the United Kingdom’s “Social Fund,”
could provide some relief (even if limited to seniors to conserve re108
sources).
Finally, education and outreach would serve twin functions both of impressing upon seniors the importance of seeking out
assistance when needed—asking for help in a context where sociologists theorize such asking is a difficult task—as well as warning them
of the deleterious effects of the credit card as a financing vehicle to
105

105. Decades ago, some commentators explored this approach. See Skoler, supra note 98, at 127. Our data show that elders have more home equity than younger filers. The median home exemption claimed was $10,000 for younger filers and
$15,000 for elders (p < 0.02). (Means were $22,991 and $54,024, respectively (p <
0.02).) This suggests that age-specific exemption law reform would be narrowly
tailored.
106. The National Consumer Law Center reports contain a prodigious array of
policy proposals to help seniors struggling with rising credit card debts. See NCLC
PART ONE, supra note 33, at 28–32.
107. Some policy commentators have struggled with the scope of appropriate
age-based financial reforms. “An important question . . . is whether policies or
other interventions should directly address the special needs and vulnerabilities of
elders or instead target particular problems that disproportionately impact elders . . . .” DEANNE LOONIN & ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
LIFE AND DEBT: A SURVEY OF DATA ADDRESSING THE DEBT LOADS OF OLDER
PERSONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 36 (2006), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=885398; see also Kurt Eggert, Lashed
to the Mast and Crying for Help: How Self-Limitation of Autonomy Can Protect Elders
from Predatory Lending, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693, 718–19 (2003) (discussing backfire
concern of “compassionate ageism” infantilizing elders who are the subject of legal
reforms).
108. For a description of the Social Fund, which publicly guarantees consumer
loans to low-income debtors, see Geraint Howells, Seeking Social Justice for Poor
Consumers in Credit Markets, in CONSUMER LAW IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 278 (Iain Ramsay ed., 1997).
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backstop current consumption shortfalls (the “cement life raft”).
While this may require a change in legislative direction, some winds
110
do seem to be shifting.
On an optimistic note, perhaps increased
use of the debit card—a payment device toward which elders exhibit
111
some skepticism—might be an easy intervention to achieve.

109

IX. Conclusion
Whether policymakers choose to engage any of these possible reforms remains to be seen. Increasing numbers of elder Americans are
falling into the financial ruin of bankruptcy, and data from the CBP
suggest that that phenomenon is linked not just to medical causes, but
the growing use—indeed, disproportionate use—of credit cards that
112
carry overwhelming interest and fees.
Further data from the CBP
suggest that this reliance on credit cards may stem more from a reluctance to ask for help than a desire to build up unsecured debt strategically. While the reluctance to seek help may come from sociological
factors unique to seniors, it may also come from the sheer lack of anyone from whom to ask for help—in the face of an environment where
a rising number of debtors cannot meet their everyday expenses on
their incomes. If this last case is true, then this increase in elder bankruptcy filings is the canary in the coal mine, warning of problems that
will become even worse as the baby boom cohort enters these income-

109. ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP:
WHY MIDDLE CLASS MOTHERS & FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (WITH SURPRISING
SOLUTIONS THAT WILL CHANGE OUR CHILDREN’S FUTURE) 123–62 (2003).
110. See, e.g., Illegal Garnishment Prevention Act, H.R. 3366, 111th Cong.
(2009). Although Social Security benefits are not subject to garnishment or attachment in bankruptcy, many financial institutions nevertheless garnish these
deposited benefits on behalf of creditors. H.R. 3366 § 2(a). This proposed bill
would have prohibited funds made available to the Secretary of Treasury or the
Commissioner of Social Security from being used to promote or encourage direct
deposit of Social Security benefits until the Secretary of Treasury promulgated
rules protecting these funds from garnishment. H.R. 3366 § 2(b).
111. See Ron Borzekowski, Elizabeth K. Kiser & Ahmed Shaista, Consumers’
Use of Debit Cards: Patterns, Preferences, and Price Response, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 149, 155 tbl.2 (2008) (reporting only twenty percent of checking account
owners age sixty-five or older made even occasional use of a debit card).
112. Note that it is the fees and interest specifically on the credit cards that are
problematic, which suggests another outlet for policy intervention. Congress
seems to have taken up this mantle with encouraging speed. See, e.g., Credit Card
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123
Stat. 1734 (2009); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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This
restricted and support-network-deteriorating senior years.
may require reconsidering the level of public support guaranteed retired members of society—a political question much too daunting to
undertake in the scope of this Article reporting bankruptcy data, but a
difficult question society will ultimately be unable to avoid.
113

113. As noted in an early work from our project, the deteriorating lot of the
elder debtor cohort could have a “trickle down” effect on younger filers too—baby
boomers who hoped to turn to their parents for help in times of financial need. See
Thorne et al., supra note 1, at 88.
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